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I. INTRODUCTION
United States Supreme Court opinions handed down over the past
fifty years appeared to have accepted and clarified the circumstances
under which agreement (conspiracy) can be reasonably inferred from
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circumstantial evidence.' These cases, however, have been placed
under a cloud by recent court interpretations of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Invoking the 1993 Daubert rule,2 defendants in several
price-fixing/bid-rigging cases have successfully raised the bar on the
"evidentiary high jump" governing the admissibility of economic and
statistical evidence presented through expert testimony.3 In each in-
stance, defendants moved for summary judgment contending that ex-
pert testimony was inadmissible under Daubert. In Ohio v. Louis
Trauth Dairy, Inc.,4 Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chemical, Inc.,5 and In re
Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation,6 defendants argued in a
pre-trial motion that economic expert testimony to be offered by plain-
tiffs should be excluded.
A recently published article argues that several antitrust trial
courts since Daubert "have fulfilled their 'gatekeeping role' by scruti-
nizing expert economic testimony under the Daubert microscope," and
1. The leading cases include: Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, (1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984);
Theater Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n. v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, (1946); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). See
also C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952); Tri-
angle Conduit and Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir.
1948), affd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336
U.S. 956 (1949); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
dismissed on other grounds, 403 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
2. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Court rejected
the "general acceptance" test by which expert testimony based on, or deduced
from any scientific principle or discovery, or true in that particular field of knowl-
edge or discipline must be generally recognized as authoritative. This test was
ruled to be in conflict with FED. R. EVID. 702. Currently, under Daubert (a) the
subject of an expert's testimony must be based on scientific, technical or special
knowledge, and (b) an expert's testimony proper must be relevant to the task at
hand, rest on a reliable foundation, and pertain to scientific knowledge. 509 U.S.
579, 592-93 (1993). Accordingly, the trial court judge now is expected to conduct
a preliminary assessment as to whether or not the reasoning and methodology of
the expert testimony is scientifically valid and can be properly applied to the facts
in issue. Daubert concerned testimony of a medical expert regarding allegations
that an anti-nausea drug marketed by defendant company and ingested by a
pregnant mother caused birth defects in two children. Compare Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (1923) with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
3. See Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996); In re
Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1506 (D. Kan. 1995);
Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
4. 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
5. 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
6. 893 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1995). After an evidentiary hearing on defendants'
motion in limine to exclude testimony of plaintiffs economic expert, the court
ruled that the expert's opinion was "economically unreliable and therefore inad-
missible under Rule 702." Id. at 1506.
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concluding "iRIn the meantime, Daubert is already emerging as a sig-
nificant evidentiary hurdle for expert economic testimony in antitrust
cases."7 A contrary interpretation of Daubert, also very recently pub-
lished, observes that "[iun recent years, the defense bar has mounted a
legal offensive, euphemistically called 'the Daubert defense,' to skew
the balance of 'expert power.'... A brief analysis of Daubert and its
progeny will demonstrate the fallacy that Daubert has licensed courts
to reduce litigation by excluding competent experts."8 Moreover, the
apparent current euphoria of the defense bar over recent Daubert
challenges to expert economic testimony overlooks the possibility
(probability?) of a "boomerang" effect when defense economic experts
themselves become the targets of Daubert challenges. This is espe-
cially true in instances where their expert contribution amounts to lit-
tle more than a simple critique of the work of others.
Care should be exercised in reading too much into these recent
opinions since both the trial and appellate courts have not been con-
sistent in their application and interpretation of Daubert's two-prong
test. Daubert has been applied in literally dozens of cases since the
1993 United States Supreme Court opinion, most of which have in-
volved product liability issues and the admissibility of testimony by
medical, epidemiological, biostatistical, or chemical experts. Chal-
lenges to economic experts represent a relatively new extension of
Daubert.9
To illustrate, (a) in Aluminum Phosphide, Judge Vratil sustained
defendants' motion to exclude testimony of plaintiffs economic expert,
after holding a ftill evidentiary hearing on defendants' motion that in-
cluded a review of the economic reports prepared by plaintiff and de-
fense experts, and a lengthy consideration of testimony at the hearing
7. See Christopher B. Hockett & Frank M. Hinman, Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony in Antitrust Cases: Does Daubert Raise a New Barrier to Entry for Econo-
mists?, ANTITRusT, Summer 1996, at 40, 42, 44.
8. See Larry E. Cohen, The Daubert Decision: Gatekeeper or Executioner?, TRIAL,
Aug. 1996, at 53, 53.
9. Clearly, the appellate courts are sharply divided, with some reading Daubert as
applicable only to 'novel scientific evidence." E.g., compare Compton v. Suburu of
Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996), and
FDIC v. Suna Assoc., Inc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996), with Tyus v. Urban Search
Management, 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2409 (1997).
In Tyus the court states,
[w]e do not agree with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Compton v. Suburu
of America, Inc., that [Daubert] is limited to cases of novel scientific theo-
ries or methodologies. It is true, of course, that the measure of intellec-
tual rigor will vary by the field of expertise and the way of
demonstrating expertise will also vary. Furthermore, we agree with the
implication in Compton that genuine expertise may be based on experi-
ence or training. In all cases, however, the district court must ensure
that it is dealing with an expert, not just a hired gun.
Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
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by both plaintiff and defendant economic experts;lO (b) similarly, in
Trauth Dairy, Judge Spiegel held an evidentiary hearing that in-
cluded affidavit testimony by both plaintiff and defense economic ex-
perts, but declined to exclude the proposed testimony;" (c) by
contrast, in Harcos Chemicals, Judge Guin did not follow the guide-
lines or standards of Daubert. He did not convene an evidentiary
hearing on defendants' pre-trial motion to determine whether the the-
ory or techniques offered by plaintiffs' experts can be or have been
tested, whether they had been subject to peer review, whether the the-
ory or techniques have been generally accepted, whether the experts
were proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly
out of research conducted independent of the litigation, or whether
they had developed theories or techniques expressly for the purpose of
testifying in the instant litigation.1 2
The tremendous degree of diversity of Daubert interpretations
among various district and appellate courts has been exhaustively re-
viewed and documented. 13 Hence, Daubert rulings on the admissibil-
10. See In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation, 893 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan.
1995). The judge's ruling is based on a detailed critique of the methodology used
and analysis performed by both experts, and thus provides a clear trail of reason-
ing demonstrating why plaintiffs expert conclusions were not considered reliable.
11. The court found that plaintiff expert's "analysis is testable, generally accepted
and reproducible." Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1252
(S.D. Ohio 1996). However, the court imposed a restriction on plaintiff experts:
They would be permitted to testify "how their analyses are consistent with other
evidence of the conspiracy" but "may not express an opinion in the form of a legal
conclusion regarding the existence of an illegal conspiracy." Id. at 1254. While it
might appear that such circumscription serves to tie the hands of experts and
weaken the impact of expert testimony, there is really nothing new here. In-
structing experts that they can testify that their findings "are consistent with
other evidence of conspiracy" but may not express a legal conclusion regarding
the existence of an illegal conspiracy really amounts to a distinction without a
difference. Id. at 1252. Economic analysis appropriately (a) focuses on an exami-
nation of economic and statistical time series data showing price level changes,
individual company bids (particularly in sealed-bid procurement), winning/losing
bidder patterns, output changes, costs, and other evidence (phone logs, meetings
involving officials of competitor companies, internal memoranda, deposition testi-
mony of officials, etc.). It does so in order (b) to reach an informed judgment and
reasoned explanation, given the totality of the evidence analyzed, whether there
is a high/low probability that the pricing, bidding and sales results were governed
by normal market forces, or alternatively whether there is a high/low probability
that those results had been artificially restrained in some manner. This is the
necessary economic finding required to satisfy the legal proof of conspiracy. In
short, the court in Trauth Dairy gave plaintiff (State of Ohio) the opportunity to
present economic testimony which was considered relevant to the issue at hand,
even though circumscribed as to the precise form in which the experts' conclusion
might be couched.
12. See Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
13. See Lisa M. Agrimonti, The Limitations of Daubert and Its Misapplication to
Quasi-Scientific Experts, A Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
[Vol. 77:83
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ity of expert economic testimony reflect some of the same confusion
and inconsistency that has characterized the application of Daubert in
other areas involving expert testimony.14 In Joiner v. General Electric
Company, District Judge Evans deemed inadmissible all of the testi-
mony of plaintiffs' experts and granted summary judgment for defend-
ants. Judge Evans also denied both the plaintiffs' and defendants'
requests for oral arguments on the defendants' joint motion for sum-
mary judgment.'
5
Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134 (Fall 1995); Bert
Black, et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REv. 715 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Com-
ing to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert's "Brave New World": The
Courts'Need to Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Validity and Pro-
ficiency Studies, 61 BROoK. L. REv. 1247 (1995); Michael C. Polentz, Post-Daubert
Confusion with Expert Testimony, 36 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 1187 (1996); Linda
Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role of the
District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TuL. L. REV. 1457 (1994); Jay
P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84
GEO. L.J. 1985 (1996).
14. The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed Daubert in response to the
controversy raised by Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ga.
1994).
15. See id. at 1326. However, on review by the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Barkett held
that in assessing the reliability of plaintiffs' expert testimony, the trial court im-
properly rejected two animal studies relied on by experts and that the trial court
improperly made a determination of whether experts' opinions were correct
rather than merely determining whether the bases supporting those opinions
were reliable. Joiner v. General Elec., Co., 78 F.3d 524, 531-34 (11th Cir. 1996).
On March 17, 1997, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 117 S.
Ct. 1243 (1997), to defendant's appeal of the Eleventh Circuit opinion, seeking
clarification, among other things, whether it is appropriate to apply Daubert in a
"one-size-fits-all" manner to both "scientific" testimony (based on the traditional
"bench" sciences, where laboratory experimentation and testing is feasible) and to
quasi-scientific testimony (e.g., accountants, economists, engineers and lawyers).
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the "gatekeeper" role of trial judges. See General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). Early on the opinion (almost grudgingly) confirms
that Daubert was intended "to allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader
range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye," but a
careful reading discloses (a) that the ruling principally addresses and affirms the
long-recognized "abuse of discretion" standard for appeals courts (in reviewing a
trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony), and (b) that the Court
passed on the opportunity to use Joiner to say more about Daubert, thus doing
very little to clear up the confusion that still prevails about the Daubert process.
Id. at 517. The opinion states: (1) "In applying an overly 'stringent' review (the
appeals court) failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of
abuse of discretion review." Id.; (2) The District Court did not err in excluding
expert testimony at issue because the animal studies cited by respondent's expert
"were so dissimilar to the facts presented that it was not an abuse of discretion
for the District Court to have rejected the experts' reliance on them." Id. at 518.
However, the Court also concluded "[wihether Joiner was exposed to furans and
dioxins, and whether if there was such exposure, the opinions of Joiner's experts
1998]
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Daubert motions typically are based on challenges to the validity,
testability or general acceptance by other scholars of the particular
methodology employed by experts. 16 Yet, the district courts in Joiner
v. General Electric Companyl7 (medical experts) and Harcos Chemi-
cals (economic experts) rested their decisions not on the methodology,
that is, whether the methods, procedures, and information used by the
plaintiffs' experts are scientifically reliable, but on the courts' conclu-
sions that were contrary to that of proffered testimony. 1 8 As a factual
matter, economic analysis grounded in modern oligopoly theory has
would be admissible, remain open questions." Id. at 519. Accordingly the Court
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case.
16. In Harcos Chemicals, defendants asserted that no economic methodology exists
by which an illegal conspiracy can be inferred from data documenting bidding
patterns, parallel behavior, and other circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding
the fact that defendants' own economic experts utilized standard oligopoly theory
to support their conclusion that the behavior of defendants was consistent with
pure oligopolistic interdependence. Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chem., Inc., 877 F.
Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
17. 864 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
18. In Joiner, plaintiffs expert medical testimony was excluded because the court
drew different conclusions from the research cited by plaintiff's experts. Joiner v.
General Elec., Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). In
Harcos Chemicals, Judge Guin did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the scien-
tific credibility of proposed economic testimony, and simply chose to accept the
conclusions of defendants' economist that the circumstantial evidence was ambig-
uous, despite the fact that this same defense expert recently had published a
scholarly treatise expressing unqualified support for the proposition embodied in
plaintiffs' expert's opinion and flatly contradicts the position he expressed in the
instant case, to wit: "Collusion can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. In
other words, even if there is no hard evidence of an actual agreement, one can
reach the conclusion that an agreement must have occurred based upon circum-
stantial evidence." ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERmAN, ANTITRUST EcoNOMIcs
206 (1985). Faced with the contradiction, the economist had testified in deposi-
tion as follows:
"A. Well, I think that this - you know, I mean, I'm obviously not going
to apologize for some sloppy wording in, you know, 400 and some
pages...
Testimony of Roger D. Blair, Vol I, p.134 in Tuscaloosa v.
Harcos Chem., Inc. 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
Moreover, on the economic meaning of tacit collusion, there was this deposi-
tion colloquy:
"Q. So you're saying tacit collusion is not collusion?
A. Well, tacit collusion is a noncompetitive outcome that emerges with-
out any agreement.
Q. Is tacit collusion collusion?
A. Well, it's certainly not collusion the way I defined collusion earlier as
an agreement.
Q. So when you're saying tacit collusion; that is, collusion without a
deeper actual meaning, that's an incorrect or at least not a statement
that you adopt at this time?
A. That's correct."
Testimony of Roger D. Blair, Vol I, p. 143 in Tuscaloosa v.
Harcos Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
[Vol. 77:83
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been (a) exhaustively analyzed and tested under different assump-
tions and configurations, (b) copiously published in economic litera-
ture over the past five decades, and (c) widely accepted at face value
for years by the courts as an essential, if not crucial element of proof in
demonstrating the presence of price-fixing, bid-rigging and other hori-
zontal agreements where only circumstantial evidence is available.19
However, economics is not a "hard" science, and it is debatable
whether economic testimony should be subjected to the same type of
standard as expert testimony by laboratory sciences. 2 0
Based upon other recent court interpretations of Daubert, there al-
ready exists good reason for the Eleventh Circuit to rule that the
Harcos Chemicals court incorrectly applied the holding in Daubert.2 1
Nonetheless, the Harcos Chemicals ruling underscores for all anti-
trust counsel and antitrust experts the importance of coming to terms
with standing requirements of Daubert and the burdens of proof they
must shoulder even when Daubert is correctly applied.
Aside from the relative merits of the complaint and defenses in
Harcos Chemicals, the Daubert rule reflects a deep disagreement and
confusion that permeates the literature with respect to the purposes
and uses of theoretical constructs (both legal and economic) and the
requirements of legal proof. Oligopoly theory instructs us that collu-
sion (a tacit or overt agreement or mutual understanding among firms
In short, according to this testimony, "tacit collusion" is an oxymoron. See
also Roger D. Blair & Richard E. Romano, Proof of Nonparticipation in a Price
Fixing Conspiracy, Rsv. INDUS. ORGANIZATION 101 (1989)(arguing that if mem-
bers of a conspiracy reached an understanding through wholly tacit means, and
they reduce output, that will identify them as colluders). It is very difficult for
one to have it both ways: i.e., (a) to take a position in scholarly publications that
circumstantial evidence demonstrating firms reached an understanding through
wholly tacit means will identify them as colluders, but (b) as a testimonial wit-
ness for defendants in a bid-rigging litigation to argue that tacit collusion really
is not collusion.
19. See W. KP Viscusi, ET AL., THE EcONOincs OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST, (2d
ed. 1995); Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel
Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTI-
TRUST BULL., 143 (Spring 1993); Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1578-83 (1969).
20. It is appropriate for economic experts to meet the tests for peer review, general
acceptance, reproducibility and testability of methodology utilized, and an estab-
lished record of publications in the specialized field of study on which expert testi-
mony is based. However, it is doubtful that economic analysis can meet the same
error-rate standard as the "bench" sciences, where repeated laboratory testing is
feasible.
21. See Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1253-54 (S.D. Ohio
1996)(denying defense motion to exclude economic and statistical expert testi-
mony and stating (1) that "the experts analysis will assist the jury to assimilate
complicated economic data," and (2) taking issue with the Harcos Chemicals rul-
ing and Dairies Can't Exclude Expert Statistical Analysis In Ohio Bid Rigging
Litigation, 70 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 1759 at 459 (1996)).
19981
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to coordinate their actions on some business objective, such as artifi-
cially raising price levels or allocating customers or markets) creates a
"non-competitive" event, that is the necessary economic finding re-
quired to satisfy the legal proof of a Section 1 violation involving a
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.2 2 At the same time,
some legal theory appears to argue that the firms in question should
not be found guilty if that same result (a) could plausibly have oc-
curred without an agreement (even though some circumstantial or tes-
timonial evidence of an agreement exists), or (b) unless it can be
demonstrated that the firms intentionally contributed to the contested
results (rigged or higher than competitive prices, allocated customers,
or arbitrarily divided geographic markets).
Short of "smoking-gun," or testimonial evidence confirming com-
petitor agreements, proof of a violation in Section 1 cases inevitably
requires an examination and evaluation of certain business phenom-
ena that, by their nature, are largely economic, statistical, and full of
complexities requiring expert exposition and explanations. 23 How-
ever, of late some judges apparently have become uncomfortable with
such testimony as a form of proof, and availed themselves of the
Daubert option. Thus, even though strong circumstantial economic
evidence has been admitted in a given fact situation showing that an
agreement of some sort existed (tacit, sophisticated or clumsy) it may
not satisfy the "form" requirements considered essential in order to
find liability. Daubert seems to hold that testing must be "scientific,"
but it is not clear on probative grounds just how this would differ from
a demonstration that a certain pattern of behavior could only have
occurred with collusion. The way the Daubert rule has been injected
into antitrust litigation adds to the confusion surrounding the policies
the courts believe they are enforcing. The confusion is twofold: firstly,
22. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads [e]very contract, ... or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, .... is declared to be illegal. 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
23. For many years judges have been comfortable making inferences regarding the
presence of illegal agreements from circumstantial economic evidence, at least
since Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). See also Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n. v Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489,494 (9th
Cir. 1952); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 168 F.2d 175
(7th Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v.
FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949). And finally, as succinctly stated by Judge Carter in
Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., "[a]s is usual in cases such as this, there exists no
proof of formal agreement .... Yet, the law contemplates that seldom will direct
proof of a conspiracy be available. Accordingly, circumstantial evidence-even in
a criminal case-provides a sufficient basis to support a determination of liabil-
ity." Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851, 861 (N.D. Cal. 1975), dis-
missed on other grounds, 403 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Cal. 1975)(citation omitted).
[Vol. 77:83
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the rule of law and its application in an instant case; and secondly, the
burden of proof requirements carried by plaintiffs.
Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding court interpretations of
Daubert serves also to alert counsel and experts involved on behalf of
plaintiffs or defendants in antitrust litigation to the possibility that
some trial judges not only may have trouble understanding and ac-
cepting as "scientific knowledge" the basic economics of monopolistic
competition, but also are not likely to recognize the particular circum-
stances under which oligopolists find it feasible and useful to engage
in concerted actions on pricing, bid-rigging and customer allocation
schemes. This is partly because even the most brilliant and exquisite
expositions of the complexities of micro-economic theory generally,
and oligopoly theory in particular, display and describe the equilib-
rium condition of a market when the governing demand/supply vari-
ables for example, the output-price-cost-profit margin relationships,
have worked themselves out.2 4
As Daubert has been interpreted, evaluation of industry behavior
based on a straightforward comparison of (a) expected prices predicted
by the standard competitive model (where price adjusts as necessary
to equate supply to demand) with (b) prices predicted by static oligop-
oly models, evidently no longer is adequate to satisfy the tougher stan-
dards set by the courts either in resolving issues raised in pre-trial
motions or in trial demonstration proper. For example, if the counts of
a Section 1 complaint allege (a) that prices have been raised artifi-
cially, (b) that sealed bids have been rigged, or (c) that customers or
markets have been allocated and divided by agreement, the critical
questions on the mind of the court still remain:
A. "Just what is it about the pricing-bidding record of rival sellers in this
case that proves a customer allocation and bid-rigging scheme must have been
contrived and communicated among ostensible competitors?"
B. "Can it be demonstrated that significantly different bidding patterns and
level of bid prices would have emerged under a competitive regime?"
C. "How can we, or a jury differentiate between (a) what appears from cir-
cumstantial evidence to reflect cooperative behavior that is tantamount to ex-
24. Standard economic analysis demonstrates graphically and descriptively the dif-
ferences that emerge in output and price-cost-profit margins under alternative
assumptions of competitive versus cartelized regimes, namely that under general
non-factual assumptions that equilibrium conditions have been reached the lat-
ter will reflect higher prices and profits and restricted output relative to the for-
mer. However, it is widely recognized (a) that this simple description of
oligopolistic behavior based on equilibrium models is sharply at odds with empiri-
cal evidence on pricing practices in few-seller markets, and (b) that industrial
organization theory must come to terms with more complicated and contrived
arrangements than models in which prices set by impersonal market forces alone
allocate goods. See Dennis W. Carlton, The Theory and the Facts of How Markets
Clear: Is Industrial Organization Valuable for Understanding Macroeconomics?,




plicit collusion (such as "conspiracy" under antitrust statutes), and (b) pure,
very intelligent business behavior such as generated by game theoretic analy-
ses (so-called 'noncooperative conduct') that arguably can generate results
similar to explicit collusion?"
In short, these questions address the pricing/bidding process, not
the equilibrium outcome.2 5 Equilibrium can result simply from oligo-
polists' individual decisions either to (a) follow the leader, (b) not to
bid successfully, (c) to maintain a differential, or (d) some other option.
Economic theory does not pretend to describe or predict any particu-
lar, or general behavioral process utilized by ostensible competitors to
effectuate a collusive arrangement or equilibrium. However, various
models of firm behavior, particularly monopoly and oligopoly models,
provide clues and special insights regarding the nature of production-
price-cost relationships one can expect under both a competitive re-
gime and a collusive ("fixed" or "rigged") regime.
Although oligopoly theory does not provide a formal model of collu-
sion describing a "step-by-step" behavioral process through which col-
lusive arrangements are consummated, extensive empirical literature
exists that discloses in detail the operations of many collusive indus-
try agreements that have been exposed in the United States and Eu-
rope, and identifies the economic context which generates collusive
practices. These studies demonstrate that firms have displayed unu-
sual skill, if not genuine artistry, inventing schemes and processes for
implementing and maintaining collusive protocols. 2 6
25. For an interesting treatment of the importance of distinguishing process and
equilibrium results, see Baker, supra note 19.
26. Well-known examples include (a) the Addyston Pipe and Steel Company which
provided the leadership for allocating certain southern and central U.S. cities to
six manufacturers of cast iron pipe. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); (b) the famous "Gary
dinners" held for steel industry executives from 1907-1911 by the chairman of
U.S. Steel's board of directors, Judge Elbert H. Gary, (who is reported to have
remarked that the "close communication and contact" provided by those dinners
generated such a high degree of "mutual respect and affectionate regard" among
steel industry leaders that all felt an obligation to cooperate with rivals and avoid
destructive competition "to be more binding... than any written or verbal con-
tract," FRITZ MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY, 87 & n.6 (1952));
and (c) the "phases of the moon" system used to allocate low bidder status in the
electric equipment conspiracy of the 1950s (with a new seller allocated the "low
bidder" position every two weeks in cycle with changes in the configuration of the
moon). See the following for a discussion of operational details of various cartels:
JOHN H. SHENFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A PIAnR (1993);
GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION (1948); Peter
Asch & J. J. Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable?, 58 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (Feb. 1976);
Walter B. Erickson, Economics of Price Fixing, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 83
(Spring 1969); Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price
Collusion: An Empirical Analysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21 (Sept. 1977); John M.
Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV. 69 (Spring 1969); Willard F. Mueller, Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the
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Among the clues and insights indicative of noncompetitive behav-
ior suggested by economic theory are: (a) the presence of any special,
artificial, or unique institutional arrangements that are conducive to
and supportive of cooperative behavior (so-called "plus factors"); (b)
the presence of bidding, non-bidding, and winning-bid patterns that
on their face are too complex or inconsistent with independent deci-
sions and exceed the bounds of behavior envisaged in "noncooperative"
game theory; and (c) the probability that such arrangements could be
implemented and maintained without explicit understandings or com-
munications among sellers. Additionally, certain types of
noneconomic evidence can be helpful in demonstrating the presence of
communications among ostensible competitors. Examples would be
telephone logs, presence of company officials at meetings, guilty pleas
of company officials, as well as affidavits by officials outlining the ori-
gins and workings of a scheme and acknowledging participation.
The purpose of this article is to suggest a straightforward method
of utilizing circumstantial output-pricing evidence, grounded in gener-
ally-accepted economic analysis to (a) differentiate bid rigging and
customer/market-allocation schemes, based on some form of explicit
communications or explicit agreements among rival sellers, from non-
cooperative tacit collusion (sheer sophisticated business acumen as
hypothesized in various game-theoretic models), and (b) to identify the
collusion process with greater precision.
II. STANDARD ECONOMIC INDICIA OF COLLUSION
It is now well established by economic analysis and numerous em-
pirical studies that certain structural characteristics of a market are
conducive to and indicative of a predisposition toward effective price
fixing.27 Moreover, two prominent judicial scholars have explained
Retail Food Industry, 2 ANTrrRUST L. & ECON. REV. 83 (Winter 1968-69); Robert
H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-
1886, 14 BELL J. ECON. 301 (1983); Robert H Porter, On the Incidence and Dura-
tion of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 415 (1985); Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Paul R.
Lawrence, Why Do Companies Succumb to Price Fixing?, HARv. Bus. REv. July-
Aug. 1978, at 145; Richard Austin Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy
(pts. 1 & 2), FORTUNE, April 1961, at 132, FORTUNE, May 1961, at 161.
27. For example, Posner identified the following characteristics which he contends
demonstrate a market's predisposition to price fixing- (a) number of sellers (the
fewer the number the lower the costs of coordinating their activities), (b) homoge-
neity of product, (c) elasticity of demand (the less elastic the demand the larger
the profits from acting like a monopoly and the greater the incentive to collude),
(d) entry conditions, (e) relative importance of price versus nonprice competition,
(f) whether the market is growing, declining or steady over time (a steady or de-
clining market is more favorably disposed to cartelization), and (g) the structure
of the buying side of the market (with many buyers and many transactions,
cheating is difficult). See RicHARD POsNER, ECONoImc ANALYsis OF LAw 267-68
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how certain types of economic evidence serve as earmarks indicating a
market has been, or is being successfully cartelized.28
More recently, an argument has been advanced using a simple out-
put test to identify nonparticipation (and inferentially, participation)
in a price-fixing conspiracy. 29 This Article demonstrates how the rela-
tionship between capacity utilization rates and pricing behavior can
serve as an effective indicator of a collusive agreement, express or
(4th ed. 1992) and Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Sug-
gested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1578-83 (1969).
28. In 1969, Posner identified certain types of economic evidence believed to be pro-
bative of collusion, namely: (a) presence of systematic price discrimination, (b)
prolonged excess capacity over demand, (c) refusal to offer discounts (i.e., lower
prices) in face of substantial excess capacity, (d) less frequent changes in prices of
noncompeting sellers than prices of competing firms, (e) abnormal (i.e., higher
than normal) profits, (f) price leadership, and (g) the presence of fixed market
shares for a substantial period of time. See Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1578-83 (1975).
In 1981, Posner and Easterbrook argued that
if the economic evidence warrants an inference of collusive pricing, there
is neither legal nor practical justification for requiring evidence that will
support the further inference that the collusion was explicit rather than
tacit. From the economic point of view, proof of hotel meetings and the
like is a detail, and conspiracies organized so that they do not produce
evidence of actual communications are no less harmful than conspiracies
that leave a trail of such evidence.
RICHARD POSNER & FRANK EASTEaBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, EcoNoMIc NOTES
AND OTHER MATERIALS 341 (2d.ed. 1981).
Finally, in 1992, Posner restated essentially the same kinds of evidence he
identified in 1969 as probative of collusion: (a) market-wide price discrimination,
(b) decline in market share of the largest firm, (c) industry-wide resale price
maintenance, (d) market shares that are too stable to be a product of normal
competitive activity among sellers, (e) regional price variations that cannot be
explained by regional differences in cost or demand, (f) a price rise coupled with a
reduction in output, (g) a fairly high elasticity of demand at current market price,
(h) a sudden and unexplained increase in profit levels, and (i) the presence of a
negative correlation between number of firms in the market and price level. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 27, at 288-90.
29. The simple output test boils down to the proposition that if the output of a firm
that claims to be innocent of participation in a price-fixing scheme rises during
the period a conspiracy has artificially raised prices, that evidence should be ac-
cepted as exoneration. Conversely, if members of a conspiracy reached an under-
standing through wholly tacit means, and they reduce output, this test will
identify them as colluders. However, the condition required for this conclusion
may not follow in cases where "demand" is institutionally determined and by its
inherent nature relatively price inelastic (e.g., a requirements contract for (a)
chlorine "demand" is determined by the amount of water or sewage to be treated,
(b) school milk "demand" is determined by the number of children eligible for
school lunch milk, or (c) other WIC (women, infants, and children) program "de-
mand" requirements are given by the number of eligible families). Hence, in such
instances the colluders will not necessarily have to reduce output in order to raise
prices, and thus by the simple output test would be exonerated. See Roger D.
Blair and Richard E. Romano, Proof of Nonparticipation in a Price Fixing Con-
spiracy, REV. INDUS. ORG., Spring 1989, at 101.
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tacit, particularly in markets having certain product and structural
characteristics.
III. OLIGOPOLY MODELS OF COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR
Oligopoly theory examines a number of issues related to the behav-
ior of firms under market structures having a relatively small number
of firms, sometimes characterized as "competition among the few."3 0
In these situations various theories of oligopoly behavior indicate how
and why each firm (appropriately) takes into account both the initial
actions and expected future responses of its rivals in deciding (a) how
much to produce and sell and/or (b) at what price the output will be
sold. Ever since the models of Cournot and Bertrand (in neither of
which did firms ever reach joint profits-maximization under their pos-
tulated assumptions) various writers have revisited both (a) the "how"
problem confronting oligopolists, (how firms could achieve higher joint
profits), and (b) the "why" problem, (why oligopolists are likely/not
likely to adhere to collusive outcomes involving "cooperative" price-
output decisions (agreements under antitrust law) versus "non-
cooperative" price-output decisions (per game theoretic postulates)).3i
30. See WILLIAm F. FELLNER, COiPETITION AmONG THE FEw (1949).
31. The simple duopoly models assume two firms of equal size and protected from
new entry. Cournot's early solution assumed that firm A first selects an output in
the expectation that firm B's output will remain the same from one period to the
next. Obviously, this is an artificial and implausible assumption, that leads the
duopolists to an output equal to two-thirds of the competitive output level. Even-
tually, Cournot derived the conclusion that increasing the number of equal-sized
firms resulted in bringing price closer to marginal cost (the competitive result),
but not necessarily joint profits-maximization. Bertrand suggested that price
should be the decision variable in the duopoly game, rather than quantity. Fi-
nally, Stackelberg reasoned that when duopolists are assumed to be more sophis-
ticated in the sense that each firm recognizes and acts on the anticipated
reactions of the other firm, they may both lose as a result of constant undercut-
ting of one another's prices. Under very simple assumptions, Chamberlin argued
that these firms will soon learn to each produce one-half the monopoly output,
with both selling their respective outputs at the monopoly price. All of the mod-
els developed by these writers illustrate the principle of interdependence, and
that the lessons of recognizing firms' interdependence under oligopolistic struc-
tures can favor actions conducive to joint maximizing, or make the solutions frag-
file, depending upon the number of firms and the degree of complexity of the sales
game (type of product, whether the product is sold under conventional quoted
price arrangements, at auction, or under sealed bidding, and number of bidding
opportunities involved). See AUGUSTIN CouRNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHE-
rATICAL PRINCIPIS OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Mac-
millan Co. 1927) (1838); EDwARD CHmBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION (5th ed. 1946); HmnucH VON STACKELBERG, MARUKFORM UND
GLEicHGEWICHT (Wien & Berlin 1934); Wassily Leontief, Stackelberg on Monopo-
listic Competition, J. POL. ECON. Aug. 1936, at 554, 554-559; J. Bertrand, Book
Review, 67 Joum. DES SAvANTS 499 (1883)(reviewing THEORIE MATHEMATIQUE DE
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The upshot of this review-given the apparent judicial trend to-
ward requiring the production of "smoking gun" evidence to prove a
conspiracy to fix prices, rig bids, or allocate markets-underscores the
problem federal and state antitrust authorities, as well as private
plaintiffs all face in differentiating cooperative collusion (price fixing
agreements under the Sherman Act) from noncooperative collusion,
(no agreement), or what some characterize as "pure, rational oligopoly
behavior." The data presented herein disclose that (a) as a practical
matter, the bid-price levels and customer allocations which emerge in
an alleged "noncooperative" (no agreement) model really have to be
"arranged" in some manner; and (b) under the profit-maximization
rule postulated in all of the various oligopoly models cited above, em-
pirical data on day-to-day price-output decisions of oligopolists can be
used to demonstrate the presence of price-fixing agreements that are
proscribed by the Sherman Act.
IV. THE TEST MODEL: PRODUCT AND MARKET
CHARACTERISTICS
The test model used in this analysis is based on empirical data
compiled for the 1980s and 1990s for regional markets around the
United States in which various dairies bid for public school districts'
annual supply contracts for milk and other products. 3 2 The markets
typically display the following characteristics:
A. The product(s) involved are homogeneous, (sold and purchased on the ba-
sis of certain specifications as to product content),3 3 and on average account
for approximately 10% to 15% of the total revenue of competing firms;
B. Industry structure consists of regional and local firms with a primary ser-
vice area having a radius from the plant of 75-150 miles; at least two firms are
present in each market, and at least one potential entrant, located at the edge
of all markets, is eligible and capable of entering into the bidding;
C. Sales are made principally on a supply contract basis to public agencies
for a specified period of time (usually 9-10 months), and suppliers are deter-
mined through a sealed-bid process;
D. Sellers do not face a demand "schedule," as such, rather they are bidding
for the right to supply a fixed quantity of products, principally half-pints of
white and chocolate milk (a requirements contract, to be awarded on an "all or
nothing" basis). A given school district demand is shown in Figure 1 as "dd"
(the buyer is interested in awarding a fixed requirements contract for the
quantity 0m which will be awarded on an "all-or-nothing" basis to the lowest
LA RICHEssE SOCIALE AND RECHERCHES SUR LEs PRINCIPES MATHEMATIQUES DE
LA THEORIE DES RICHESSES).
32. For a more detailed description of the source data for this paper, see Robert F.
Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. INDus.
ORG., 413 (1996).
33. School districts typically purchase a range of products for their school lunch pro-
gram; the bulk of purchases are half-pints of whole, lowfat, chocolate and skim
milk, but contracts also may include buttermilk, milkshake mix, orange juice,
fruit-flavored drinks, sour cream and yogurt.
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bidder).3 4 In these kinds of markets the buyer (i.e., the school district) is pre-
pared to award the contract at the lowest bid price emerging from the bidding
process. As a practical matter "dd" is truncated at some upper bound, say at
P2, above which the buyer might reserve the right either not to award the
contract or to submit it for re-bid;
E. A given seller can expect to receive numerous invitations to bid during a
given bidding season, involving up to fifty or more bidding opportunities;
F. Prior to each bidding opportunity during the bid season and prior to the
deadline for submission of bids each seller has access to the following market
information: (a) total volume requirements of the buyer for the 9-10 month
supply period; (b) last year's winning bid and volume sold to that buyer; (c)
earlier winning bids announced during the current bidding season; (d) the due
bid date; and (e) contract award date;
G. Contract proposals involve a commitment to deliver the product require-
ments on an agreed-upon schedule over a 9-10 month period, with deliveries
commencing a few months after award of the contract. In effect, from the
standpoint of sellers, the bidding process consists of selecting a strategy for
filling each firm's advance "order book," which affords important operational
advantages to the firm;
3 5
34. See Appendix, Figure 1. Strictly speaking, the relevant body of "oligopoly theory"
that is most useful in understanding and predicting pricing of oligopolists under
sealed-bid conditions is the theory of auctions. Under the first-price auction, the
lowest bidder receives the bid. Under these market conditions, it is highly likely
(as Nobel laureate George Stigler noted years ago) that collusion is facilitated in
few seller markets where public agencies promptly and accurately report all bids.
Both economic theory and empirical findings indicate that when bidders compete
to sell a good, as the number of sellers increases, the expected level of bids will be
lower. This result follows principally as a function of the number of sellers, but in
dairy markets it is affected by two other important economic characteristics: (a)
bidders (dairies) in each market have substantial sunk costs in existing plants,
and (b) they have substantial excess capacity, notably productive capacity, for
processing and bottling milk in half-pint containers. School milk contracting
thus is a case of first-price auction, with the school district buyer (alter ego of
consumers in a price competition model) having a unit demand, and each seller
(dairy) knows its costs of supplying one unit of the product. See Viscusi supra
note 19; Lance Brannman, et al., The Price Effects of Increased Competition in
Auction Markets, 69 REv. EcoN. STAT. 24 (1987); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empiri-
cal Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 1I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIzATION 1011 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Dennis W.
Carlton, The Theory and the Facts of How Markets Clear: Is Industrial Organiza-
tion Valuable For Understanding Macroeconomics?, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 909 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); and
George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 JouR. L. ECON.
(October 1966), reprinted in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 259-95 (1968). For
extensive surveys of the literature on auctions, see Eric Maskin & John G. Riley,
Auction Theory with Private Values, 75 A. ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 150
(1985); R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 JoUR.
EcON. LITERATURE 699 (1987); Paul R. Milgrom, Auction Theory, in ADVANCES IN
EcoNorfc THEORY: FirH WORLD CONGRESS 1, 1-32 (Truman F. Bewley ed.,
1987).
35. Economists classify markets according to the manner in which sales and produc-
tion are organized. For example, firms may produce first, and then build and
hold inventories in the expectation of selling offthe inventory over time. In these
cases, firms are characterized as producing to "stock." Alternatively, firms may
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H. All firms rely on a standard production technology, involving a single raw
material that (a) usually is in abundant supply, (b) whose supply is subject to
government regulation, (c) whose basic raw material cost constitutes 50% to
60% of total costs of end product(s) involved in the contract bidding, and (d)
whose production technology is "lumpy" in the sense that the minimum effi-
cient scale of plant for producing the product in question can easily supply
50%, 75%, or even 100% of the total demand requirements for the relevant
geographic market (including school districts, other institutional buyers and
the retail commercial market);
I. Production functions of all firms yield short-run cost curves similar to
those displayed in Figure 2, and are characterized by the principal feature
that marginal cost falls sharply at relatively low rates of production and re-
mains virtually constant until the plant is fully utilized, (90% to 100% utiliza-
tion based on a work day of two eight-hour shifts (sixteen-hours per day));36
J. All sellers are qualified and eligible to bid on all available contracts, that
is, no supply limitations are present;
K. All sellers are assumed to be profit-maximizing entities, and act indepen-
dently in establishing bid prices;
L. All sellers regard the product in question as a marginal cost/marginal rev-
enue type of business-meaning that, as long as the incremental revenue gen-
erated by another unit of sales exceeds incremental costs, it pays for the firm
to bid for and book the business.
3 7
A. Bid Strategies
Since the nature of the business "game" in question concerns the
rate at which various sellers choose to fill their respective order books
(commit their capacity) alternative bidding strategies are feasible,
provided all sellers follow the dictates of the short-run profit-max-
imization rule.
Some obvious seller strategies include:
1. Bertrand/Cournot strategy: sellers attempt to reach a 50/50 sharing of
the quantities involved in successive winning bids, in a two-firm game, a 113,
1/3, 1/3 sharing in a three-firm game, a 1/4, 1//4, 1/4, 1/4 sharing in a four-firm
game, etc;
bid for sales (produce "to order") in an auction or bid situation. In that case they
bid to fill advance order books, as is true for public school milk contracts. The
latter, bidding to fill advance order books, has many advantages for a firm, nota-
bly the opportunity to develop a bidding strategy to fill its advance order book
and rationalize future production schedules, thus minimizing costs of inventory
holdings. Moreover, in cases where risk of spoilage of product exists, such as in
milk products, production "to order" or for contract sales may provide additional
cost savings to the firm.
36. See Appendix, Figure 2. Some dairies operate their plants twenty hours, seven
days per week (two and one-half eight-hour shifts, and one-half of a shift (four
hours) for cleaning/maintenance). That means they are capable of half-pint pro-
duction in excess of the capacities shown in Figures 3-7 and Table A-1 in the
appendix.
37. This description of the decision strategy for school milk business is found in depo-
sition testimony of several managers of various dairies involved in antitrust liti-
gation covering school milk contracting in the Southeast during the 1980s. See
Lanzillotti, supra note 32.
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2. Early "high-bid" strategy: a given seller may test the market in the early
bid opportunities with a high bid-price strategy relative to the last known
winning bid in a given market or current winning bids in adjacent markets;
3. Early "low-bid" strategy: a seller may adopt an early low-bid strategy (rel-
ative to prior year's prices) in order to place some initial orders on its books;
4. "Mixed-bid" strategy: a firm may follow a "mixed" strategy, (for example,
pursue strategy (1) and strategy (2) in such a manner that sales are "split");
5. Selective account strategy: a firm may elect to bid only for school district
contracts that the firm won in the preceding year;
6. Early "no bid" strategy: a firm may elect not to bid on early bid opportuni-
ties in the expectation (hope?) that its rival(s) will fill their order books, thus
permitting a firm with an open order book to win contracts at bid prices higher
than previously offered. The wisdom of this strategy is highly questionable
since each firm generally has operated during the school year with substantial
excess plant capacity, and each is capable of supplying most (at least 75% to
80%) of foreseeable school district and other institutional requirements.
Strictly speaking, the model should also consider the bid strategies
of the buyers, in this case, school districts. The typical school district
strategy in the past has been to rely on the expectation that the dis-
trict would receive the best competitive (lowest) price under a sealed-
bid auction arrangement. Buyers would not shop around a bid but
would award the contract to the lowest bidder. Another strategy, used
in the past by some public entities, and adopted in recent years by
some school districts, consolidates bid dates so that sellers are obliged
to bid for a group of school district contracts on a given date, rather
than to bid for school district contracts one-by-one. The optimum ver-
sion of this buyer strategy is to consolidate all school district con-
tracting into a single bid date.
B. Bidding Constraints
1: Contract commitments for utilization of productive capacity at
price P or higher up to output 0m, in Figure 2 are profitable, since
throughout this range MC of the firm is < "industry" MR (which we
assume is _< to the most recent/last winning bid price). Average varia-
ble costs (AVC) and incremental costs (MC) per half-pint are constant
up to near the full capacity utilization of M2.
3 8
2: All firms are free to bid or not bid.
3: All firms' bids remain sealed until publicly opened prior to
award. At that time all bids are made public, including the winning
bid and winning bidder.
4: Winning bidders are free to sub-contract for supply, but contract
supply responsibility cannot be shifted to sub-contractors.
According to standard economic theory and the profit-maximiza-
tion principle, it is profitable for the firm engaging in sealed-bid (auc-
tion) sales of school milk contracts to commit capacity utilization per
38. Of course, average variable costs are still "variable" throughout the range of out-
put, in the sense that total dollar costs rise as half-pint production is increased.
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week for an entire school year, as long as incremental revenue (MR)
per half-pint >_P (> AVC) in Figure 2. Likewise, it is profitable for the
firm to commit additional capacity up through weekly utilization rates
of Om, 0ml, 0m2 etc., so long as incremental revenue (bid price P)>
incremental cost MC. This means that in the range of capacity com-
mitments up through om bid prices (MR) at P or higher are profita-
ble since the firm is covering all direct costs (AVC) as well as part of
indirect (fixed) costs as shown by the position of ATC.
Thus, at any given time during the bidding season, while order
books are being filled through auctioning of school milk contracts, it is
profitable for the firm to offer a bid price P incremental costs MC.
Whenever a firm (a) has committed only a fraction of its capacity (e.g.,
has uncommitted excess capacity of 50% or higher), and (b) tenders
losing bid prices in the range P 1 - P 2, a question can be raised whether
the firm is participating in a collusive arrangement, because a bid
anywhere above P would be profitable and more likely to win. The is-
sue may be resolved by looking at capacity utilization and the P-MC
or the MR-MC margin.
C. Test Hypothesis
The basic hypothesis to be tested is as follows: Collusion may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence disclosing the pattern of rival
sellers' (a) actual bid prices, and (b) non-bidding or refusals to bid, in
relation to (c) advance commitments of production capacity relative to
the level of uncommitted capacity (magnitude of excess (unused)
capacity).
This hypothesis, which might be viewed by the trier of fact as a
rebuttable presumption, will be tested utilizing circumstantial evi-
dence covering price levels, bidding practices, and commitment of pro-
ductive capacity, based on the following general standard:
If, for an extended period during the bid season, a seller (bidder) in any given
market, meets the conditions listed below, that seller is in a de facto collusion
mode:
1. a bidder's bookings for the season (a) total less than 70%-75% of its
rated productive capacity, (b) expected incremental revenue (MR) > ex-
pected incremental cost (MC), and (c) the bidder fails to bid;
2. a bidder frequently sets its bid price at a significantly higher level
(10%-20%) than expected MC, and that bidder consistently wins those con-
tracts; or
3. a bidder frequently sets its bid price at a significantly higher level
(10%-20%) than expected MC, and that bidder consistently loses those con-
tracts; and
4. a bidder's expected MR associated with any given bid during the bid-
ding season is > MC, and that bidder bids only for new supply contracts
with accounts on which it was the winning bidder in past (last year's)
competition.
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V. A TEST CASE STUDY: BIDDING PATTERNS FOR SCHOOL
MILK CONTRACTS
This analysis will test the foregoing proposition in a two-firm (du-
opoly) market structure, but it is testable under various other market
structure settings. In accordance with the early Cournot/Bertrand/
Stackelberg models and modern game theory discussed above, sophis-
ticated businessmen in a noncooperative (noncollusive) game will se-
lect a level of output for each firm that results in each firm
maximizing its profits, given the output (sales) of its rival(s), in effect
a Nash equilibrium. 3 9 Duopoly constitutes the market structure most
favorable to a defendant in order to test the proposition that under a
Cournot (or other game theory model involving infinitely repeated it-
erations of that model) competitors a priori should be able to reach
and sustain a noncooperative Nash equilibrium based purely upon
their recognized interdependence. It is important to note that the first
order equilibrium conditions for duopolists to reach and sustain the
joint profit-maximizing price and output solution are that in each bid-
ding opportunity both bidders must simultaneously select a price and
an output commitment that will maximize joint profits (or, more ap-
propriately, the sum of discounted expected joint profits).
Since the context of the test hypothesis is a sealed-bid game, in-
volving contract auctions at different times and different buyers with
varying requirements, knowledge of past prices and past sales of ri-
vals will not necessarily represent accurate and reliable information
regarding any seller's next bid price (without some form of communi-
cation), especially, if either or both sellers (a) have uncommitted ca-
pacity, and (b) recent winning bid prices were significantly higher
than current marginal costs. Thus, whenever either firm has substan-
tial uncommitted (excess) capacity and expected incremental revenue
of either firm exceeds its current marginal cost, it will be profitable for
that firm to lower bid prices (to the point where price = marginal cost)
in order to book the business. 4 0 The crucial differentiating character-
39. Economists define a Nash equilibrium as a pair of outputs (sales) such that each
firm's output (sales) maximizes its own profits, given the expected output (sales)
of the other firm.
40. An appropriate question is whether firms pursuing this MiR/MC pricing rule for
its products (setting bid prices that cover all direct costs (AVC) but do not fully
cover fixed (capital) costs) over the "short-run" would be able to remain in busi-
ness in the "long-run7 (that period of time in which entry of new firms and exit of
established firms are possible). First, as noted above, school milk sales typically
constitute only 10% to 15% of total dairy revenues. Second, school milk contracts
provide dairies with valuable joint-production advantages (including pasteuriza-
tion-production schedules and the opportunity to package excess processed milk
as school milk products versus having to use the excess processed milk for lower-
valued products). Third, school milk contracts also provide valuable commercial
advertising/promotional advantages with many "captive" markets consisting of
large numbers of future customers. In short, this model should be appropriate for
1998]
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istic of sealed bidding versus other traditional market sales is that
"posted" or "list prices" as such do not exist, and past bid prices of
rivals do not necessarily represent current joint profits-maximizing
prices.41 Also, in a "non-cooperative" situation, each firm must esti-
mate what its rivals will do in future bid situations.
Hence, under this situation it will be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to provide the necessary algorithms for a Nash equilibrium
without some form of communication or agreement between sellers. It
is demonstrated below that even in the duopoly situation, pure recog-
nized interdependence (for example, Chamberlin's "conscious parallel-
ism") without more, cannot explain bidding patterns. Moreover, a
noncooperative Nash equilibrium becomes increasingly difficult with
larger and larger numbers of firms involved in a sealed-bidding situa-
tion. Put differently, such an outcome is highly unlikely without some
form of overt communication or agreement.
A. Bidding Patterns for School Milk Contracts Generated
Under a Duopoly: Some Empirical Evidence
The accompanying charts present a chronological display of the
bid-price patterns of a duopoly for school milk contracts in the greater
Cincinnati market (encompassing three counties in Kentucky and
testing a broad range of public procurement contracting conducted under sealed-
bid auctions.
41. Of course, copious empirical evidence exists indicating the frequency with which
firms using various and imaginative arrangements, have attempted and suc-
ceeded in reaching agreements with competitors. However, aside from legal risks
of such behavior, many other obstacles stand in the way of firms being able to
sustain agreements based on tacit arrangements ("non-cooperative" equilibria of
various game theoretical models which are highly sensitive to the assumptions
postulated). Nonetheless, some economists continue to assert that non-coopera-
tive collusion is a perfectly reasonable expectation of rational profit-maximizing
business firms, that are sophisticated enough to recognize their mutual interde-
pendence and to attain joint profit-maximization. In reality, when uncertainty
and other realistic assumptions are introduced, matters become much more com-
plex and a cartel breakdown is almost inevitable without the presence of overt
agreements, monitoring devices and penalties for cheating.
Moreover, notwithstanding, guilty pleas by corporate executives, plus crimi-
nal convictions of both individuals and corporations in the dairy industry, one
economist has testified that the obverse is true; that is, notwithstanding their
having pleaded guilty to a bid-rigging complaint, rational business officials would
not engage in collusive arrangements because of legal risks, the threat of penal-
ties and damage to personal reputation: "Everyone knows that guilty pleas are a
cheap way to buy out governmental plaintiffs, who have vast (taxpayer-provided)
resources." Kentucky ex rel Gorman v. U.C. Milk Co., Inc., Civ. A No. 4:92-CV-47-
M, 1996 WL 179571 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 1996), "Supplemental Report of Fred S.
McChesney for Defendant U.C. Milk Company, Inc.," October 21, 1994, p. 6.
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three in Ohio) during the period 1983-1990,42 compiled from bidding
records.43 The figures display for each duopolist the relationship
between its (a) bid prices for lowfat white ("LFW"), the normal indica-
tor price in determining winning bidder, (b) raw milk cost to the dairy,
per federal marketing order ("FMO" price), (c) marginal cost per half-
pint ("dock cost7),44 (d) cumulative contracted volume,4 5 and (e) excess
(uncommitted capacity).
4 6
42. See Appendix, Figures 3A-7B. For similar data disclosing bid prices during the
1983-1990 bidding seasons for 3-firm, 5-firm, and 7-firm structures in other
school milk markets in the Southeast, see Lanzillotti, supra note 32.
43. Various data on bid prices, sales, production, and costs were obtained through the
discovery process in a pending companion case to Ohio v. Lewis Trauth Dairy,
Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996), filed earlier by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, involving the same two defendants. One defendant company (Meyer
Dairy) pleaded guilty to bid rigging in Ohio and Kentucky. However, the other
defendant company (Trauth Dairy) has maintained its innocence, and was acquit-
ted in a criminal case in Ohio. The Kentucky civil case is still pending on appeal
to the Sixth Circuit against Trauth Dairy. See Appendix, Table A-1 for detailed
tabulation of bid "let" dates, incumbent bidder, school district and county in-
volved, dock cost data, current and prior duopolists' bid prices, duopolists' rated
productive capacity (per week) and cumulative excess capacity (per week).
44. The major cost components consist of raw milk (including an "over/under" pre-
mium), processing, containers, transportation, and overhead (plant, equipment
and general sales/administrative costs). Based upon confidential capacity and
cost data made available to the author, short-run average total costs per half-pint
("AT C " in Fig. 2) in the 1980s were in the range of 11.5 to 12.5 cents and what
dairies call "dock costs" (marginal costs ("MC" in Fig. 2)) were in the range of 9.0
to 9.5 cents through the summer of 1989, and rising to 11.0 to 11.5 cents in 1990.
In a few instances where monthly dock costs were not available, they were esti-
mated from known FMO-dock cost differentials. The only additional cost items in
ATC not included in "dock costs" are distribution (driver) costs and general sales
and administration (GSA).
45. It should be noted that the two dairy companies bid on school contracts and serve
commercial accounts in a much broader market than the six-county metropolitan
area of Cincinnati, that is the geographic focus of pending litigation on alleged
bid-rigging on school milk contracts. Trauth Dairy's sales radius extends as far
south as Lexington, Kentucky and as far north as Columbus, Ohio. Likewise,
Meyer Dairy serves a broader area north into a large part of Ohio and south into
central Kentucky. Since several other dairies were operating in the area outside
metropolitan Cincinnati, both in Kentucky and Ohio, it apparently was more dif-
ficult to extend and maintain the alleged conspiracy in the broader market.
46. Certain other relevant data are available for determining whether the bidding
patterns emerged out of pure tacit (non-cooperative) behavior or whether the bid-
ding reflects explicit collusion, including-
(a) prior year bids of each company;
(b) estimated current marginal cost per half-pint ("dock cost");
(c) estimated weekly capacity for Trauth Dairy is assumed to have been
approximately 612,000 half-pints, between 1983-84 and 979,000 half-
pints after 1984; for Meyer Dairy 1,468,000 half-pints for the entire pe-
riod studied; it is further assumed that the companies operated with two
eight-hour shifts (sixteen-hour work day), and a five-day work week;
those capacity estimates are based on an 85% efficiency factor;
(d) cumulative contracted volume;
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Displayed in each of these figures are several different types of
chronological data pertaining to the respective productive capacity
and cost and bids of the duopolists. They are as follows:
1. the number of bid opportunities is shown below the horizontal base line
of each figure (1, 2, 3 ... 9; bid opportunities 10 and higher are stacked (e.g.
1 1 1 2 )). Instances where duplicative bid opportunities occurred on
0,1,2,... 0
a given date are shown with a letter beneath the bid opportunity number
1 1
(e.g., 6 (=16A), 6 (=16B), etc.);
A B
2. a capital letter designating the incumbent bidder (the firm that won the
previous (last year's) contract with that school district) is shown above the
horizontal base line ("T" or "M");
3. an asterisk above the letter indicates that the incumbent was the winning
bidder;
4. the letter "Z" indicates that some firm other than one of the duopolists
typically supplying this market won the contract;
5. the percentage of uncommitted capacity existing on a given bid opportu-
nity date is designated with "dashed" lines and letters for each duopolist ("T-
T-T" and "M-M-M"); the uncommitted capacity displayed is based on a
one-day lag, that is, bid prices on a given day are paired with excess capacity
existing at the end of the previous day;4 7
6. marginal cost (dock cost for low fat white milk) is shown as indicated;
7. bid prices for each duopolist are displayed with "solid" lines and letters
("T-T-T" and "M-M-M).
Figures 3A, 3B and Table A-1 in the Appendix display these data
for the years 1983 and 1984.48 For 1983, the data show: (1) active
bidding between the duopolists for contracts, (2) bid prices trend to-
ward marginal (dockY costs, that remained constant throughout the
year at approximately 9.5 cents, (3) winning price margins (relative to
dock costs) averaged 10.4% for the bid season, (4) no consistent pat-
tern of winning bidders, that is, incumbents did not necessarily win
(e) cumulative "excess" (uncommitted) capacity on any given date during
the bid season;
(f) bid prices are displayed for lowfat white milk ("LFW") in half-pint
containers; the LFW bid price is used to indicate winning bidder; data
for lowfat chocolate milk ("LFC") and whole white milk ("WW") generate
figures similar to those displayed for LFW. Dock costs for these products
would be somewhat higher because they cost more to produce.
47. Although Trauth Dairy and Meyer Dairy school milk bids are displayed only for
the six-county Cincinnati metropolitan area (which is the focus of the alleged con-
spiracy) the uncommitted capacity figures are based on all sales of the two
dairies, both inside and outside the six-county area, with certain exceptions (no
data are available for sales by several distributors of Meyer Dairy and Trauth
Dairy). However, the magnitude of these sales is estimated not to be sufficiently
large to affect the uncommitted capacity figures by more than 5% to 10%.
48. The conspiracy is alleged to have run from the 1984 school year through the 1988
school year. Accordingly, the years lying outside that period are referenced
herein as "pre-" or "post-" conspiracy.
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bids, and in several instances an outside company won the bid, and (5)
the duopolists ended the bid period with 65% to 47% excess capacity,
respectively for T and M.
The bidding patterns for 1984, the first year of the alleged conspir-
acy period (1984-1988) reveal the following: (1) some variability of bid
prices; (2) winning bid prices yielded an average gross margin of 33%
on dock costs of 9.5 cents (1.5 cents to 4.5 cents) and a gross margin of
3.5 to 6.5 cents above raw (FMO) cost; (3) the incumbent was the win-
ning bidder in all except 3 of 28 bid opportunities; and (4) the duo-
polists ended the bid season with 45% and 70% excess capacity,
respectively.
Figures 4A, 4B and Table A-1 in the Appendix display data for the
same variables for the school years 1985 and 1986, showing: (1) bid
prices ranging from roughly 12 to 15 cents per half-pint in 1985 and
1986; (2) gross margins over dock costs for the winning bidder aver-
aged 48.3% in 1985 and 51.7% in 1986 (3.3 to 6.0 cents), and 5 to 8
cents over (FMO) cost; (3) the incumbent dairy was the winning bidder
in 31 of 34 and 31 of 33 bid opportunities in 1985 and 1986, respec-
tively (yielding incumbency rates of 91% and 94%); in the few in-
stances when the incumbent did not win the bid, an outsider was the
winning bidder; and (4) in both years, T ended the bid season with an
estimated excess capacity of more than 70%, while M had 40% to 50%.
Figures 5A and 5B shows the bidding results for 1987 and 1988
(the last full year of the alleged conspiracy period): (1) some variability
of prices in both years, but at an even higher average level than dur-
ing 1984-1987; (2) winning bid prices yielded average gross margins
on dock costs of 53.3% and 54.9%, respectively for 1987 and 1988 (4 to
7 cents) with dock costs running around 9 cents throughout the bid
season and 6.5 to 9.5 cents above raw (FMO) cost; (3) the incumbent
was the winning bidder in 28 of 32 and 32 of 34 bid opportunities,
respectively, yielding incumbency rates of 88% and 94% (in two in-
stances in 1988 the winning bidder was an outsider); and (4) duopolist
T ended up the 1987 and 1988 bid seasons with excess capacity of 67%
and 51%, respectively and duopolist M with 31% and 11%.
In sum, the data disclose that during 1984-1988 (a) winning bid
prices, (b) gross margins on dock costs, and (c) incumbency rates all
rose substantially. Moreover, the duopolists frequently violated the
profit-maximization rule in setting their respective bid prices, because
each consistently allowed its rival firm to win contracts at prices con-
siderably higher than marginal (dock) costs, and at much higher mar-
gins than in 1983, despite the fact that each had considerable
uncommitted capacity. 49
49. As noted earlier, our estimates of uncommitted (excess) capacity may be slightly
on the high side, because only limited sales data are available for certain compa-
nies that served as distributors for the duopolists for customers in Kentucky,
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Figures 6A and Table A-1 in the Appendix display the bidding re-
sults for the 1989 bid season, the first alleged "post-conspiracy" year:
(1) prices are more volatile than in 1988; (2) winning bid prices gener-
ally yielded average gross margins over dock costs of 23.7% (2 to 4
cents) with dock costs running at approximately 9.5 cents (and a mar-
gin of 5 cents above raw (FMO) cost); (3) the incumbent was the win-
ning bidder in 21 of 30 bid opportunities, with both T and M taking
contracts away from one another, especially the latter part of the year;
and (4) the duopolists ended the bid year with approximately 29% and
15% excess capacity, respectively.
Finally, the bidding results for 1990 (Figure 6B) disclose: (1) win-
ning bid prices are considerably more volatile throughout the year,
varying from 14 cents to 17 cents (with one win at 18.5 cents); (2) win-
ning bid prices yielded average gross margins of 36.3% on dock costs
(which had risen by 1.5 to 2 cents over 1989) and 6.5 to 9.5 cents above
raw (FMO) cost;50 (3) the incumbent was the winning bidder in about
65% of the contracts (21 of 30 bid opportunities); and (4) seller T ended
the season with 47% excess capacity and seller M with only 4% excess
capacity, evidently due to more aggressive bidding (winning in 17 of
30 bids, and taking contracts away from incumbent T in four in-
stances, and T returning the favor by taking an equal number of con-
tracts away from incumbent M).
B. Bid Prices in the Greater Cincinnati Area, 1992-1995
An appropriate question concerns the pattern of bid-price data for
what has been identified as the alleged post-conspiracy period. Such
data for the same duopolist dairies in the Greater Cincinnati area for
the school bid years 1992-1995 are displayed in Figures 7A and 7B
and Table A-2 in the Appendix. A comparison of the bidding patterns
Ohio and Indiana. Meyer Dairy's Kentucky distributor accounted for annual
sales of 1,000,000 half-pints (28,000 per week), or the equivalent of 1.4% of Meyer
Dairy's indicated capacity. Likewise, Trauth Dairy's distributor in Kentucky ac-
counted for annual sales of 300,000 half-pints (8,500 per week) or 1.2% of the
weekly capacity indicated for Trauth Dairy. Similarly, sales by both dairies' dis-
tributors in Ohio accounted for sales that constitute only a small fraction of the
two firms' indicated capacity displayed in the appendix tables and the various
figures referred to earlier. In summary, even if both companies' uncommitted
(excess) capacity is reduced by two or three-times these sales, the adjusted level
of uncommitted capacity is still too high to be consistent with a profit-maximizing
bidding posture.
50. The higher margins over dock costs reflect general uncertainty concerning ex-
pected increases in raw milk costs. This uncertainty was occasioned by the ex-
traordinary volatility of raw milk costs in the winter of 1989-90. At that time raw
milk costs rose sharply to unprecedented levels, squeezing profit margins of dair-
ies committed to firm-price supply contracts. This episode resulted in markedly
higher school milk prices throughout the Southeast.
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for these years and the patterns for the 1984-1988 period reveals the
following:5 1
1. Bid prices were generally lower during the 1992 bid season
than the 1984-1988 bid seasons, ranging from 13.5 to 15.5 cents per
half-pint, and show a slight decline over the bid year. Likewise in
1993, bid prices were similar to 1992, and the winning bid price de-
clined over the bid year. Bid prices declined during 1994, ranging
from 12.75 to 14.50 cents, and following a slight rise then decline dur-
ing the bid year. Finally, average bid prices were even lower in 1995,
ranging from 12.7 to 14.0 cents per half-pint, and generally declining
over the bid year. It is notable that the end-of-season bid prices in
1995 were approximately two cents lower than end-of-season bid
prices in 1992;
2. Incumbency rates were much less stable than during the pe-
riod 1984-1988, falling to 71%, 64%, 47% and 61% in 1992, 1993, 1994
and 1995, respectively. It can be seen that Meyer Dairy and Trauth
Dairy underbid one other on incumbent accounts in many instances;
3. Average winning bid margins on dock cost were 33.3%, 42.6%,
37% and 34.7%, respectively in 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. Moreover,
an examination of bid prices versus raw (FMO) costs,5 2 disclose gross
margins of 83% to 87% which were clearly higher than the 39% in bid-
year 1983,53 arguably a "pre-conspiracy" year, 69% and 85% in 1984
51. It should be noted that following the exposure of school-milk bid rigging conspira-
cies of the 1980s (in Florida and elsewhere), various school districts in Kentucky,
Ohio and elsewhere consolidated bid-letting procedures to minimize the opportu-
nity for bid rigging. Some examples include the C.KE.C. (Central Kentucky Edu-
cational Cooperative, consisting principally of several hundred schools in
Nicholas and Harrison counties, and the largest co-op buying group in Kentucky
and Ohio), the E.P.C. (Educational Purchasing Cooperative centered in Dayton,
Ohio), and the H.C.C_.A (which began co-op buying operations in 1991 for 226
schools in Hamilton, Clermont, Butler and Brown counties). Under the new buy-
ing arrangements, dairies currently are obliged to bid on a consortium of school
districts with a single bid date, as contrasted with the earlier period when the
dairies were able to pick off, rig and allocate school districts one-by-one. In conse-
quence, since a larger bloc of business is at stake on each bid it has led to more
aggressive bidding generally, and particularly large consolidated contracts up for
bid early in the bid season. Another result is that the total number of bid oppor-
tunities for the 1992-1995 period is smaller than during the 1984-1988 period.
This, in turn, also affects the incumbency rate comparisons for the two periods.
Finally, it should be noted that the data available documenting the winning bid-
der in Ohio for 1991 are incomplete; hence, it was not possible to compute the
incumbency rate for 1992. See Table A-2 in the Appendix.
52. Dock costs shown for 1992-95 are based on confidential information made avail-
able to the author, which, based on known dock cost/FMO cost relationships he
believes are representative of dock costs for Trauth and Meyer dairies for the
1992-1995 period.
53. Any interpretations of the changes in average winning bid margins relative to
dock costs and FMO raw milk cost should factor in that both dairies incurred
extraordinary litigation costs during the 1992-1995 period. Meyer Dairy incurred
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and 1985, and generally lower than the 96% and 111% margins found
at the height of the alleged conspiracy (1987-1988);
4. Data on committed and uncommitted capacity are not avail-
able for this period, so it is not possible to compare the bid-price levels
versus uncommitted capacity. Nonetheless, during the 1992-1995 pe-
riod a somewhat more aggressive bidding pattern is in evidence, that
is, more like 1983 than 1984, and sharply different from 1988.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The impact of the 1993 United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Daubert relative to the legal status and economics of price-fixing be-
havior in the absence of documentary evidence containing direct proof
of a conspiracy (agreement in restraint of trade) has been examined.
The analysis disclosed that while ostensibly intended to impose more
rigorous standards governing the admissibility and weight accorded to
expert testimony, the Court's ruling has provided defendants with a
new opportunity to challenge, preclude and exclude altogether the of-
fering of expert economic analysis and testimony in Sherman Act Sec-
tion 1 cases.
Prior to Daubert, plaintiffs typically and successfully relied on in-
ferences drawn from price behavior comparisons with hypothetical
competitive situations. As noted above, subsequent to Daubert, faced
with making a choice between two alternative explanations of certain
interfirm price behavior, some judges have rejected outright proposed
expert testimony through approval of summary judgment motions
(without convening an evidentiary (Daubert) hearing) or have ac-
corded zero weight to expert economic testimony supporting plaintiff
allegations of collusion based on circumstantial evidence. These
judges have essentially adopted defense contentions that the circum-
stantial evidence was ambiguous, that is, the evidence was not clear
or was consistent with two or more possible meanings. 54 Such rulings
heavy litigation costs and a $5,000,000 settlement of the antitrust claim by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Trauth Dairy has incurred more than three
years of heavy litigation costs in two other antitrust cases (not including the cost
of the Kentucky complaint which continues to the present). Just how these costs
might have affected bidding decisions in the 1992-95 period is not known.
54. The "ambiguity" and "implausibility" arguments are an artifact unique to the cir-
cumstances in Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., that concerned
(a) the plausibility (likelihood) that foreign producers of electronic products would
agree to sell their products in the U.S. at low (predatory) prices in order to gain a
larger market share, presumably after which prices would be raised in concert to
recoup losses incurred; and (b) the ambiguous nature of the data presented in
support of that proposition. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-97 (1986). It needs to be emphasized that the plausibil-
ity of agreements developing among rival sellers to raise prices, rig bids, or allo-
cate markets or customers to attain higherjoint profits, as alleged in most Section
1 cases, involve a markedly different species of agreement from what was alleged
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evidently accept implicit defendant contentions that the observed pric-
ing behavior not only is ambiguous, but it is equally plausible that the
observed pricing and sealed-bidding behavior, according to some for-
mulations of modern oligopoly theory ("game" theory), is simply the
natural result of brilliant independent business acumen, and not nec-
essarily the result of interfirm agreements.
In order to accept this line of defense argument, in the face of in-
criminating circumstantial evidence, judges must determine more
than whether collusive and non-collusive explanations of observed in-
terfirm pricing behavior are equally conceivable or equally plausible
(per game theoretic models). The crucial issue to be decided is
whether there are equally high probabilities that the observed behav-
ior could arise from either non-collusive or collusive actions, in com-
plex sealed-bidding, auction situations such as described above.
Daubert represents a rather dramatic change of course in the judi-
cial treatment of evidence adduced by plaintiffs to support Section 1
complaints, especially since those very theories of oligopoly which con-
stitute the basis for defendant arguments (Cournot, Bertrand, and
more recently Nash) confirm the improbability, if not impossibility of
some types of observed pricing-bidding behavior (such as described
herein) emerging without a collusive agreement. 5 5 Moreover, we have
observed that, as interpreted by some district courts, Daubert not only
has raised the requirements of legal proof carried by plaintiffs in trial
proceedings proper, it has also opened the door to full-scale, pre-trial
defendant challenges to expert testimony, with the express purpose of
preventing the trier of fact and jury from ever viewing a presentation
of crucial economic and statistical evidence, or hearing expert exposi-
tion of the economic foundation for plaintiffs complaint and offers of
proof.
in Matsushita, namely, an agreement to sell at lower prices and lower profits or at
a loss.
55. As Fisher has stated,
[wihat, then, does game theory have to say about repeated games? Alas,
nothing remarkably helpful to the general analysis of oligopoly. The
best known result here is the so-called "folk theorem," which states that,
in an infinitely repeated game with low enough discount rates, any out-
come that is individually rational can turn out to be a Nash equilibrium.
Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J.
EcoN. 113, 116 (1986). And,
[b]ut the crucial question for oligopoly theory is not that of the outcome
of one-shot games. Rather it concerns the factors and circumstances
leading to cooperative, joint-maximizing outcomes in repeated games.
There, as already mentioned, little is known, and the folk theorem
strongly suggests that simply analyzing Nash equilibria... cannot tell




A duopoly model was presented and tested for a specific form of
collusion in a sealed-bid, contract auction market, utilizing actual
product and market structure conditions and actual price and output
data compiled for the 1980s and early 1990s. While the methodology
is testable for different types of market structures, it was tested under
a duopoly market structure, because a two-firm market (involving
sales of a standardized product, with low elasticity of demand, slow
market growth rate, and very similar cost structures) a priori repre-
sents the easiest market condition for coordinating pricing decisions
without an overt agreement. Utilizing circumstantial evidence discov-
ered on pricing-output and bidding patterns, a straightforward
method was outlined based on standard economic analysis and con-
forming to the higher evidentiary standards required by Daubert, to
differentiate (a) explicit collusive pricing and bid-rigging from (b) non-
cooperative (tacit) collusion based on sophisticated behavior (as hy-
pothesized in game theoretic models).
Furthermore, economic analysis of the empirical data utilized in
the test model revealed that because of the complexity of the data, the
sealed-bid constraint, and the large number of bids tendered over the
bidding season, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a game
theory model to provide the decision strategy necessary to produce the
observed pricing-bidding patterns, without some form of direct com-
munication or agreements between the duopolists. 5 6 In short, courts
need to hear expert testimony, based on standard economic analysis,
explaining whether there is a high or low probability that the ob-
served pricing and auction-bid behavior could have been effectuated
without some form of direct communication or agreement.
In particular, with respect to the proposition tested, the data for
the 1984-1988 period disclose that the duopolists satisfied all three of
the basic standards identified as indicative of a collusion mode: (a)
ending the season with considerable uncommitted (excess) capacity,
(b) winning bid prices at levels well above marginal (dock) costs (more
than 20% or higher), and (c) a consistent winning pattern by the in-
cumbent firm. By contrast, the bidding patterns examined in the al-
leged "post-conspiracy" period, 1992-1995, show generally lower
winning bid prices, and lower incumbency rates, that are indicative of
a move toward more competitive conditions in the market.
Finally, production of data through the discovery process covering
prices, bids, capacity, capacity commitments, production costs, and
other financial data, such as those displayed in this analysis, provide
56. See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial
Organization: An Introduction and Overview, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 259, 285 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (noting
that "because repetition [in this case, bid opportunities] enlarges the set of equi-
libria, selecting an equilibrium becomes difficult").
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the essential raw material for meeting the requirements of the
Daubert rule as it has been applied in price-fixing/bid-rigging litiga-
tion. An analysis of these kinds of financial data, supplemented by
data on market structure characteristics, facilitating devices, and
other economic evidence identified by Posner and others as probative
of both a disposition toward and actual emergence of collusive ar-
rangements in certain market structures, help document relevant op-
erational details on pricing, bidding, and production commitments,
that expert economic testimony can utilize to corroborate (or refute)
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Figure 3A
Duopoly Bidding Patterns For School Milk Contracts
In Greater Cincinnati
School Year = 1983
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Figure 5A
Duopoly Bidding Patterns For School Milk Contracts
In Greater Cincinnati
School Year = 1987
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Figure 7A
Duopoly Bidding Patterns For School Milk Contracts
In Greater Cincinnati
School Year = 1992
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Figure 7B
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